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SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES AND THE
JUDICIAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT MORASSJOY V. NOR TH
In recent years, there has been a widespread call for increased controls
on business activity.' Revelations of corporate corruption at home and abroad
have fueled suspicions of the commercial world. 2 The very fact that small
groups of businessmen manage vast sums of other people's money seems
to present dangerous opportunities for fraud and scandal. 3
Although government was initially reluctant to interfere in business affairs,"
it has now become deeply involved in regulating commerce.' The courts have
contributed to the fight against corporate abuse by enforcing these legislative
1.See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976) (suggesting changes
in corporate structure and function that would enhance shareholder power); R. NADER, M.
GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976) (urging federal chartering of
corporations and placing representatives of public interest groups on corporate boards); Cary,
A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. :1101 (1974) (calling
for federal legislation establishing minimum standards for corporate behavior); Sonde & Pitt,
Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the Wind!, "
16 How. L.J. 831 (1971) (urging the use of federal securities laws to deter corporate misconduct); Lewin, The CorporateReform Furor,N.Y. Times, June 10, 1982, at DI, col. 3 (discussing guidelines proposed by the American Law Institute for regulating corporate governance).
2. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1101-02 (1977) (media
reports of corporate misconduct read like baseball box scores) [hereinafter cited as Coffee,
CorporateMisconduct]; Ross, How Lawless Are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at
56 (listing numerous examples of corporate scandals); see also Vagts, Directors:Myth and Reality,
31 Bus. LAW. 1227, 1227 (1976) (society has always been somewhat suspicious of businessmen);

Russo & Wolfson, Why Must Boards Change?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, at F16, col. 3
(corporate corruption is no greater today, yet government justifies increased regulation by giving
"anecdotal accounts of occasional corporate misbehavior"). Most recently, the discovery that
American corporations had been paying substantial amounts to foreign governments and political
groups to secure favorable treatment seemed to confirm the reports of increasing "white collar" corruption. See generally Herlihy & Levine, CorporateCrisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 547 (1976),
3. In 1932, Berle and Means dramatized the growing separation of ownership from control in American business. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968). These commentators interpreted this phenomenon to mean that with
little or no financial stake in the corporation, directors had little incentive to serve the
shareholders. Id. at xxxv.
4. See, e.g., Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 562, 565-66 (1966) (regulation of business was viewed with suspicion as being economically
disruptive, to be tolerated only as a necessary evil) [hereinafter cited as Note, Continuity 1 iabilityJ.
5. For instance, corporations are subject to antitrust laws, federal securities laws, and state
corporation laws. They must also comply with federal regulations governing employment
opportunity, labor relations, minimum wage and maximum hour requirements, and laws covering employee benefit plans. In addition, the federal government regulates corporate conduct
with respect to the environment, product safety, consumer warranties and credit, and advertising. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned
Corporation-Statement of the Business Roundtable, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2090-91 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Business Roundtable].
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checks and by allowing private individuals to seek redress for corporate

wrongs.' One such judicial remedy is the shareholder's derivative suit.7 In
a derivative suit, shareholders may sue for the enforcement of corporate
claims against third parties or against the corporate directors themselves.'
Not surprisingly, the business community has protested that excessive
restraints on managerial discretion, including increased derivative litigation,9
have diluted corporate strength and are contrary to society's best interests.'"
Business has fought back. In an effort to dispose of costly derivative suits, '

many corporate boards have appointed special litigation committees comprised of outside directors' 2 to decide whether a shareholder's suit serves
the company's best interests.' 3 Skeptics regard this practice as a corporate
ploy to obscure misconduct and subvert derivative litigation." Management,
however, views the committee as an effective tool for eliminating suits which
ultimately do more harm than good for the corporation. 5
The courts are sharply divided on how to deal with special litigation
6. The shareholder has three legal remedies against corporate misconduct. If the stockholder
has been injured as an individual, he may file an individual action against the alleged wrongdoers.
See 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5911, 5915 (rev.
perm. ed. 1980). When the injury is suffered primarily by the corporation, however, the
shareholder may file either a pure class action or derivative suit. Id. § 5908. For an overview
of these three remedies, see Comment, Special Litigation Committees: An Unwelcome Solution
to Shareholder Demands, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 485-88.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 41-76.
8. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
9. See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 75 (1967)
("derivative actions . .. are indeed big business"); Mattar, Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Corporate Boards of Directors and Trustees-A Legal Guide for the Director, 83
COM. L.J. 550, 550 (1978) (growth of third-party and shareholder suits has been "exponential"); see also Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative
and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 306, 325 (1980) (statistical analysis of the growth
of derivative litigation).
10. See, e.g., Business Roundtable, supra note 5, at 2091 ("[these restraints] impose excessive and unnecessary costs-costs borne ultimately by the consuming public").
11.See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
12. Outside directors are board members who are not company officers and who do not'
participate in the corporation's daily management activities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 994 (5th
ed. 1979). They are compensated only for their services as outside directors and have no other
connection with corporate management. Cohen, The Outside Director-Selection, Responsibilities
and Contribution to the Public Corporation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 837, 837 (1977).
13. See infra notes 76-90.
14. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 799 (E.D. Va. 1982)
(noting the danger of letting defendant-directors appoint "a few 'good ol' boys' " to ensure
directors' exoneration); Payson, Dismissal of Derivative Actions: The Debate, 6 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 522, 522 (1981) (one group of sharks judging another); Stegemoeller, Derivative Actions
and the Business Judgment Rule: Directoral Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL. B.J. 338,
342 (1981) (foxes guarding the henhouse); see also Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the
Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
261, 261-62 (1981) (judicial acceptance of the litigation committee constitutes a threat to the
continued existence of the derivative suit); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 146 (1980) (without judicial
intervention the committee device will lead to the death of derivative suits).
15. Payson, supra note 14, at 522.
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committees.II Recently, in Joy v. North, I7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit seriously curtailed the ability of litigation committees
to terminate derivative suits. In a two-to-one decision, the court refused to
extend to these committees the full measure of discretion traditionally afforded directors under the business judgment rule.' 8 Instead, the majority
opinion held that in cases in which shareholders are not required to demand
that the board pursue a corporate claim,' 9 lower courts interpreting Connecticut law must render an independent business judgment of the corporate
interest in continued litigation.2" More importantly, the Second Circuit outlined an elaborate procedure to assist the courts in making this assessment. 2 '
In many respects, Joy v. North is an ill-considered opinion. Grounded
on a skeptical view of special litigation committees, the Second Circuit's
decision ignores the uncontroverted evidence that these committees are in
no way pawns of the defendant-directors. The Joy court also exaggerates
the role of the derivative suit as a "watchdog" on management and undermines the historic function of the business judgment rule in corporate law.
Moreover, in an effort to reach its result, the Second Circuit disregards important legal principles.
The significance of Joy v. North is that it is certain to cause problems
for both courts and corporations. By requiring judges to deliberate over a
number of sophisticated, elaborate, and somewhat obscure issues, this decision will greatly complicate derivative litigation. Joy will encourage this litigation by stifling the ability of Connecticut corporations to terminate vexatious
suits. Joy also will result in the demise of the special litigation committee
in that jurisdiction, despite its beneficial role in corporate law. Finally, the
Second Circuit's opinion will place unwanted costs on the shareholders it
purports to protect and, ultimately, on society as well.
This Note will discuss directorial liability, derivative suits, and special litigation committees. It will then review the case law on litigation committees
and describe how the Joy case has expanded significantly on the concept
of judicial business judgment as applied to these committees' decisions.
Finally, the Note will analyze Joy v. North, discuss its impact, and conclude that the Second Circuit's opinion is a prime example of why courts
should refrain from engaging in corporate decision making.
THE BUSINESS

JUDGMENT RULE

The business judgment rule is a common law doctrine that protects corporate directors from liability for mistakes of judgment.2 2 While the rule

16. See infra notes 92-131 and accompanying text.
17. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
18. Id. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see textaccompanying notes 22-40.
19. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
20. 692 F.2d at 891; see infra text accompanying note 157.
21. 692 F.2d at 891-93; see infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
22. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 1039, at 37. For a general discussion of the business
judgment rule, see Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
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condones honest errors,23 it does not insulate directors who fail to exercise
reasonable care2" or who act in bad faith.25 By demanding diligence and
a high degree of loyalty,2 6 the business judgment rule reflects the notion

that directors have fiduciary obligations to the stockholders whose money
they control.27

Although it is not surprising that the business judgment rule arose in an
era of laissez-faire philosophy,2" a variety of practical considerations explain
its persistence. The rule is based on the historic role of the board of directors as the guiding force of the corporation.29 It recognizes that businessmen

are not infallible3" and that they do not insure the success of the business."
23. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 1039, at 37.
24. Id. § 1040, at 44.
Directors are not merely bound to be honest; they must also be diligent and careful
in performing the duties they have undertaken. They cannot excuse imprudence
on the ground of their ignorance or inexperience, or the honesty of their intentions; and, if they commit an error of judgment through mere recklessness, or want
of ordinary prudence and skill, the corporation may hold them responsible for the
consequences.
Id. (quoting Wangrow v. Wangrow, 211 A.D. 552, 556, 207 N.Y.S. 132, 136 (App. Div. 1924)).
The generally accepted standard of care is that which a reasonably prudent man would have
exercised under similar circumstances. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
Bank directors, however, are normally held to a higher standard of accountability than directors of other corporations. See Lippitt v. Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 462, 94 A. 995, 999 (1915)
(issue is not what a reasonably prudent person would have done, but what a reasonably prudent banker would have done); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (bank
directors held to higher standard than ordinary corporate director); see also 3A W. FLETCHER,
supra note 6, § 1035, at 28.
25. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.) (rule inapplicable
in cases of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching, and abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (directors
called to account only for self-dealing, fraud, or bad faith); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec.
Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978) (absent fraud or-some other corrupt motive, directors are
not ordinarily held liable for mistakes of law or fact). Questions of bad faith encompass conflict of interest situations in which the directors' loyalty to the corporation is in doubt. 3A
W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 1039, at 38.
26. Arsht, supra note 22, at 96 (limitations on rule's application place significant duties
on directors).
27. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 783 (Del. 1981) (directors owe
a "well-established" fiduciary duty to the corporation).
28. Note, Continuity Viability, supra note 4, at 565 (rule based on notion that "the free
play of human motives, all in themselves selfish and acquisitive, works out to promote the
highest benefit to society").
29. Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980). Directors derive their authority
to manage the corporation from state law. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979); see,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1983); COHN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West
Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157.33 (1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
30. Arsht, supra note 22, at 99-100.
31. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 22, § 1035, at 28. The corollary to the notion that direc-
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The business judgment rule encourages risk taking and entrepreneurship,3 2
and it presumes that holding directors to an unreasonably high standard of
care would frustrate commerce and discourage competent people from assuming directorships.33 In addition, the rule acknowledges that the judicial system
a flood of litigation questioning the propriety
would be unable to handle
4
3

of business decisions.
Consequently, under the business judgment rule, directors are entitled to
a presumption that their actions were taken in good faith3" and for a rational
business purpose.36 Courts will not second-guess their decisions unless the
plaintiff can prove a breach of fiduciary duty.37 If the plaintiff sustains this

burden of proof, the business judgment rule becomes inapplicable and the
burden shifts to the directors to prove the transaction's "intrinsic fairness"
to the corporation. 3' Essentially, the business judgment rule guarantees limited

tors do not guarantee a profitable operation is that shareholders assume the risk of losing
part or all of their investment. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983). Purchasing stock is a voluntary undertaking in which one assumes
the risk of loss; this undertaking acts as a vote of confidence in the management of a corporation. Id. Because the potential profitability of an equitable investment tends to vary according
to the risk involved, shareholders often diversify their holdings. Id. at 886; see also Stegemoeller,
supra note 14, at 339 (shareholders assume risk of loss for honest management errors); Wolfson,
A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 972 (1980) ("Shareholders are not
owners; they are risk takers.").
32. Cf. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978) (rule
recognizes that corporate prosperity requires directorial flexibility); Arsht, supra note 22, at
99-100 (rule acknowledges riskiness of business decisions).
33. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 149 (1891) (strict standards of accountability
would make "gentlemen of character and responsibility" unwilling to become directors) (citing
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 21 (1872)); Arsht, supra note 22, at 97 (rule grew from judicial
concern that competent people would not serve as directors if the law demanded extraordinary
prescience and ability); see also Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1969, at 1, col. I (concern over liability
has caused many men to "politely decline" offers to serve on boards).
34. Arsht, supra note 22, at 95.
35. See Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903) (directors
are presumed to act honestly); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)
(directors presumed to act properly and in good faith); Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp.
705, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (rule presupposes an honest judgment exercised with due care); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (directors enjoy presumption of sound
business judgment).
36. Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harborfrom Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business DecisionsAn Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. LAW.
1247, 1251 (1982).
37. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff bears initial
burden of proving bad faith); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980) (courts will
not second-guess directors if they exercise judgment without conflicts of interest); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (court will not disturb business judgment unless
plaintiff shows "gross and palpable overreaching").
38. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-21 (Del. 1971); Note, Continuity Viability, supra note 4, at 572.
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judicial review 39 while placing a heavy burden on shareholders who challenge
corporate transactions."'
THE SHAREHOLDERS DERIVATIVE SUIT

"[Bjorn of stockholder helplessness,"' the derivative suit arose at equity
as a device to prevent injustice to the shareholders. 4 2 The derivative suit provides a remedy for mismanagement and abuse of corporate assets by allowing shareholders to represent the corporation in actions against directors or
third parties."3 In effect, it functions as a dual cause of action: first, as
a suit on behalf of the shareholders seeking to force management to bring

a claim; and second, as a suit on behalf of the corporation against the alleged
wrongdoers. 4 Any recovery belongs to the corporation,

'

except for corporate

reimbursement of the plaintiff-shareholder's attorneys' fees. 46 From a financial perspective, the shareholder is actually a nominal plaintiff'7 because his
financial stake in the suit's outcome-an appreciation in the value of his
stock-is usually marginal.' 8 The incentive to litigate often lies with the plaintiff's attorney,' 9 who hopes to earn generous fees if the litigation confers
39. Veasey, Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Background, 6
J. CORP. L. 518, 521 (1981).
40. Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); see also id. (equity
stepped in where common law was too lax and stockholders had no standing to sue at law);
Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980,
992 (1957) (suit arose as a response to wrongs for which legal procedures were inadequate).
42. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (equity came
to the relief as a means of restitution); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del.
1981) (shareholder's right to litigate corporate claims is intended to prevent injustice) (quoting
Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 443, 141 A. 277, 282 (1927)). Providing the derivative
suit as a remedy for wrongs to the corporation, and to the shareholders as a body, is considered the compensatory rationale. See infra note 76.
43. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5941.1, at 362-63.
44. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
45. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5953, at 387.
46. Id. § 6045, at 626. The derivative suit is an exception to the "American rule," whereby
a winning party is not entitled to attorneys' fees absent statutory authorization. Bailey v. Meister
Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1976). The rationale for requiring the corporation
to reimburse the successful plaintiff for his attorneys' fees is two-fold. First, to allow other
shareholders to benefit from the litigation without contributing to its expense would constitute
unjust enrichment. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). Second, reimbursement of attorneys' fees encourages beneficial derivative suits which shareholders would otherwise be unable to bring. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1498 (1983) (quoting W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 938 (5th ed. 1980)).
47. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
48. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983);
see also Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View
From The Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 311, 329 (1982) ("Even a huge money recovery will prove
inconsequential to most shareowners.").
49. Joy, 692 F.2d at 887. Derivative plaintiffs' attorneys often take litigation on a contingent fee basis. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
DEL.
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a "substantial benefit" of some kind on the corporation. 5"

Before a dissatisfied shareholder may bring a derivative suit, he must first
demand that the directors pursue the action in the corporate name. 5 This
common law requirement, embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,52

directs the plaintiff either to state specifically in his complaint his efforts
to persuade the board to take such action, or to explain why a demand
would have been futile. Like the business judgment rule, 3 the demand requirement defers to the directors' authority to manage corporate affairs, including litigation." It also gives the board an opportunity to decide whether

HARV. L. REV. 849, 871 (1975). Ordinarily, attorneys' fees range from 20 to 30% of the total
award. 2 R. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 18.22, at 51 (1981). Some representative
attorneys' fees are as follows:
Award
Gross Recovery
Litwin v. Allen (Guaranty Trust)
$ 750,000
$ 286,000
Gallin v. Nat. City Bank
1,847,943
452,500
Winkelman v. General Motors
4,500,000
795,000
Ripley v. Int'l Ry of Central Am.
16,700,000
2,105,000
Heller v. Boylan (Am. Tobacco)
1,585,000
682,000
Newmark v. RKO General
7,920,000
750,000
D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 504 (1973).
50. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395 (1970) (noting a trend toward
allowing attorneys' fees as long as the corporation receives a substantial benefit from the
litigation-even if the benefit is nonpecuniary); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982,
995 (7th Cir. 1976) (substantial benefit rule is "well settled"); see also Lewis v. Anderson,
509 F. Supp. 232, 236 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (fees may be awarded even if defendants render case
moot by bringing about beneficial changes); Neese v. Richer, Ind. App. , -,
428
N.E.2d 36, 39 (1981) (fees awarded for compelling corporate accounting even though plaintiff
lost on issues of mismanagement, fraud, and conversion); Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 327
(even a losing plaintiff-shareholder may have a claim against the corporate treasury).
51. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5963, at 398-99. In Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S.
450 (1881), the Supreme Court stated that before initiating a derivative action, the shareholder
had to "make an earnest, not a simulated effort, with the managing body of the corporation,
to induce remedial action on their part, and this must be made apparent to the court." Id.
at 461. One commentator states that the original purpose of the demand requirement was to
prevent judicial intervention in corporate affairs until all internal remedies were exhausted.
Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 168, 171 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Standing Requirements].
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. This rule also requires that demand be made o the shareholders
"if necessary." Id. This requirement does not bear directly on the issue of the termination
of derivative suits by litigation committees and therefore will not be discussed. For a review
of the demand on shareholders requirement, see Comment, Standing Requirements, supra note
51, at 182-91. In most jurisdictions, however, demand on shareholders is required either rarely
or not at all. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5964, at 405.
53. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978) (business judgment and demand requirement are "inextricably linked").
54. See Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (demand
allows directors to occupy normal role as corporate managers); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.) (demand requires plaintiff to show why directors are
incapable of doing their duty), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Comment, Standing Requirements, supra note 51, at 171 (demand reflects the basic policy that corporate management
is entrusted to directors).
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or not litigation serves the corporation's best interests." By requiring the
plaintiff to exhaust his intracorporate remedies,5" the demand procedure treats
the derivative suit as a final alternative."
If the board of directors refuses to bring suit in a good faith exercise
of business judgment, the plaintiff's claim will be dismissed. 8 In order to
maintain an action, the plaintiff must show that the board's refusal to sue
was wrongful. 9 In United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co.,6" Justice Brandeis described the circumstances in which a derivative suit
would survive board refusal. When the directors are guilty of mismanagement constituting a breach of trust, or when they have a conflict of interest
that prejudices their judgment, the plaintiff may pursue a cause of action
despite the board's refusal to litigate.' Alternatively, if the court excuses
demand as futile because the board would clearly oppose the suit, the plaintiff may maintain an action on his own behalf. 2 Whether or not demand
55. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917) (whether
to enforce corporate claims is a business question left to directors' discretion); see also Corbus
v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903) (corporate interests are sometimes
best served by waiving a legal right); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 456-57 (1881) (litigation
is not always the answer to wrongs committed against the company); Comment, Standing Requirements, supra note 51, at 171-72 (directors are in a better position than shareholders to
know whether a claim is worth pursuing).
56. H. HEN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 364, at 1067-68 (3d ed. 1983).
57. Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F.
Supp. 1172, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471
(1979); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE J 23.1.19, at 82 (2d ed. 1982).
58. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5969, at 423-24.
A Stockholder cannot sue where the refusal of the directors ... is properly within
thelir] discretionary power with respect to the internal affairs of the corporation
vested in them by the charter, where they act, not fraudulently, illegally or
oppressively, but in good faith, in the exercise of their discretion, and for what
they deem to be the best interests of the company.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
59. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981); Comment, Standing Requirements, supra note 51, at 169.
60. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
61. Id. at 263-64; see Joy, 692 F.2d at 887-88 (demand not required when there is a conflict
of interest among the directors); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(no demand required when shareholder alleged directors' actions were abuse of shareholder
trust), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). Case law has interpreted these words to encompass situations in which the directors are either controlled by the
alleged wrongdoer, interested in the transaction, or they actually participated in the actions
attacked. Other authority supports the plaintiff's standing to sue when the board failed to
bring a constitutional claim or when refusal to sue was itself illegal. Comment, Standing Requirements, supra note 51, at 193-98.
62. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5965, at 410. Courts will excuse a plaintiff's failure
to make demand under various circumstances. Demand has been deemed futile when the alleged
wrongdoers constituted a majority of the board; when the directors had a conflict of interest
predisposing them to dismiss the claim; when the alleged wrongdoer(s) dominated the board;
and when the directors' opposition to the suit was manifest. Comment, Standing Requirements,
supra note 51, at 173-82; see also 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 5965, at 410-11. Shareholder
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is required rests largely within the court's discretion. 63
The history of derivative litigation has been marked by controversy. Cor-

porate directors often react with hostility to derivative suits against board
members for a number of-reasons."4 First, between the cost of paying corporate counsel, wading through complex litigation, and funding the legal
expenses of the successful party, derivative litigation can seriously drain corporate assets. 6 Second, the corporation suffers in terms of the paralysis of66
key personnel, lowered employee morale, and a tarnished corporate image.
Third, and perhaps most important, suits against directors represent a threat

to the honor and business careers of people who may have been instrumental in building the company.6" Furthermore, critics point to abuse of the
action in the form of "strike litigation," derivative suits which are instigated
allegations of futility, when unsupported, will usually be insufficient to excuse demand. Cramer
v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 277 n.23 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Kauffman Mut.
Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). In practice,
the situations in which demand is considered futile and in which a board's refusal to sue is
deemed wrongful are similar in nature. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10
(Del. 1981).
63. 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.1.19, at 83 (2d ed. 1982); see, e.g., Abramowitz
v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1033 (2d Cir. 1982) (trial court did not abuse discretion by requiring
demand); Fields v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682, 684-85 (7th Cir. 1971) (demand procedure is within the sound discretion of the court).
64. Dykstra, supra note 9, at 75.
65. Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Actions: Viva
Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAw. 27, 29 (1981). If the plaintiff's suit is successful, the corporation is
required to pay the plaintiff's litigation costs and 'attorneys' fees. D. VAGT'S, supra note 49,
at 504. An unsuccessful plaintiff may also have a claim to these expenses under the "substantial benefit" rule. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. When the defendant-directors
prevail, the corporation usually pays their attorneys' fees in addition to its own because all
states either require or permit indemnification for litigation expenses. Block & Prussin, supra,
at 29 n.4; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a(c) (West Supp. 1983) (mandatory);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1974) (permissive); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42-12(b)
(1981) (permissive); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (permissive).
The corporation also pays the attorneys' fees of all parties pursuant to a settlement agreement.

Block & Prussin, supra, at 29 n.4.
In addition, some statutes permit corporate indemnification of directors against amounts paid
in judgments and settlements if the court, in its discretion, deems it proper in light of attendant circumstances. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 33-320a(c) (West Supp. 1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42-12(b) (1981). Because

directors are routinely indemnified, many corporations insure themselves against these potential
costs. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE

L.J. 895, 911 (1972) (indemnification of liability creates a circular effect by which the corporation returns amounts awarded in recovery and pays substantial legal fees as well); Johnston,
Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW.

1993, 2012-36 (1978) (discussing a variety of corporate insurance plans protecting directors against
the heavy cost of litigation and liability that they otherwise would be unable to sustain).
66. See Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 29 (suits "seriously disrupt" business and generate
bad publicity); Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 332 (cost of derivative litigation includes injury
to company morale and diversion of time and talent).
67. Klein, Conduct of Directors When Litigation is Commenced Against Mdanagement, 31

Bus.

LAW.

1335, 1359 (1976).
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by attorneys for the sole purpose of claiming large fees from the corporate
treasury.6" Consequently, corporate directors usually try to minimize losses
by settling out of court or seeking prompt dismissal of the suit. 69
Despite charges of champerty'0 and legislative threats on its life, 7' the
derivative suit continues to thrive, 2 largely because of its acceptance as a
"useful gadfly" 3 that deters corporate corruption." Its proponents argue
that by holding management more accountable to the shareholders, the suit
has remedied many corporate wrongs, and even unsuccessful suits have called
attention to questionable business practices. 75 Moreover, it is said that the
mere threat of derivative litigation has a cleansing effect on the business
community.76 Within the past ten years, however, a new development has
shattered all semblance of derivative tranquility.
68. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 56, § 358, at 1039 n.22 (3d ed. 1983). See generally
Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1934) (discussing the practice of some derivative plaintiffs' attorneys to instigate potentially costly litigation
that corporations will seek to avoid by settling out of court, effectively "paying off" the plaintiff's attorney).
69. Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 29.
70. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 985 (2d ed. 1981). Champerty is defined as "a bargain
by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the
litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the

proceeds or subject sought to be recovered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979).
71. Following the Wood Report on derivative suits, F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944), New York and a number of states enacted securityfor-expenses statutes. Typically, these statutes require that shareholders owning less than five
percent, and less than $50,000 (market value), of corporate stock post a security for the corporation's reasonable litigation expenses. See Note, Security For Expenses in Shareholders'
Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 50, 51-53 (1968). Once
considered the death knell of the derivative suit, these statutes are now relatively easy to avoid.
Id. at 50; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 261. Nevertheless, between security-for-expenses,
demand on directors and shareholders, and the contemporaneous ownership requirement, the
obstacles to bringing a derivative suit are not insignificant. Dykstra, supra note 9, at 75.
72. See supra note 9.
73. Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit,
73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 747 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, Demand in Derivative Suits].
74. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (derivative suit
is the "chief regulator of corporate management"); Dent, supra note 14, at 96 (suit has "long
played a crucial role in assuring a modicum of integrity and competence in the management
of corporations"); Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsi-

ble?, in

THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY

48 (E. Mason ed. 1973) (derivative suit is the

"most important procedure the law has yet developed to police the internal affairs of corporations"); Note, Demand in Derivative Suits, supra note 73, at 746 (derivative suit serves as
a means of enforcing fiduciary duties).
75. See, e.g., Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 30-31 (derivative suits contributed to the
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977); Dykstra, supra note 9, at 77-78
(derivative suits have challenged excessive salaries, watered stock, usurpation of corporate
opportunities, secret profits, excessive stock options, unlawful purchases of corporate securities,
improvident loans, abuse of subsidiary by parent, and other misconduct).
76. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (derivative suit is an incentive to avoid mismanagement). To a large extent, attitudes toward the derivative suit depend
upon whether its principal purpose is considered one of compensating injured shareholders or
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A combination of factors compelled corporate boards to establish committees of outside directors authorized to determine whether a particular
derivative suit was in the company's best interests. Increased derivative litigation, burgeoning legal expenses, concern over directorial liability,77 and the
inability of allegedly wrongdoing directors to terminate suits" contributed
to the development of a device to gain control over the derivative suit. In
addition, it had become commonplace to use outside director committees
to perform corporate tasks such as auditing, compensating management, and
nominating director candidates." Consequently, pursuant to state laws allowing corporate boards to delegate specific authority to committees, 80 special
litigation committees were created.
Typically, the special litigation committee is comprised of two or three
outside directors elected after the alleged wrongdoing is discovered. 8' Independent counsel often assists the committee, 2 and one aspect of its investigadeterring directorial wrongdoing. The deterrence theory is conducive to a wide use of the suit
as a method of preventing misconduct before it occurs. In contrast, the compensatory theory
promotes an approach more narrowly limited to correcting the injustice presented. Most courts
have favored the compensatory theory, and some have even expressed skepticism of the suit's
deterrence rationale. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 302; see, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostok R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 717-18 n.14 (1974) (punishment of a
wrongdoer does not justify enrichment of others at the wrongdoer's expense) (quoting Home
Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 673, 93 N.W. 1024, 1035 (1903)). But see Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 302 (a purely compensatory rationale is no longer adequate; deterrence is suit's proper purpose); Dent, supra note 14, at 114 (deterrence may be suit's most
important function).
77. Cf. Johnston, supra note 65, at 1993 (increased litigation against management has created
interest in protecting directors from liability); Mattar, supra note 9, at 550 (directors are increasingly aware of potential liability).
78. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of
Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979) (discussing nomination, compensation; and audit committees); see also Note, Special Litigation Committees and the Business Judgment Rule: Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado and Joy v. North, 14 CONN. L. REV. 193, 201 (1981) (the litigation committee concept is analogous to ratification of interested director transactions by a disinterested
board majority); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 600, 608 n.44 (1980) (Securities and Exchange Commission is partly responsible for litigation committees due to its practice of requiring corporations, pursuant to settlement agreements, to appoint interim outside directors to prevent further violations of securities
laws) [hereinafter cited as Note, Business Judgment Rule].
80. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-318
(West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38
(1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-1983).
81. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1982) (two), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1498 (1983); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (two); Auerbach
v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 624, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (1979) (three);
see also Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979) (three: two post-wrongdoing
outside directors and one nominal defendant director), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey
v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979) (seven outside directors).
82. See, e.g., Joy v. North 692 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1982) (independent counsel); Lewis
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tion is an assessment of the merits and potential success of the plaintiff's
claim. 3 The committee's mandate is primarily business-oriented, however,
because it requires weighing the cost of litigation, the interruption of corporate affairs, the effect on employee and public relations, and the extent
of the injury suffered by the corporation, as well as ethical considerations."'
If the committee decides not to pursue litigation, it may recommend an out-

of-court settlement" or compel counsel to seek an early dismissal of the
case. 86 It is in the latter instance that the business judgment rule operates
as an affirmative bar to the plaintiff's derivative suit. 87
Criticism of the special litigation committee largely centers around the concept of "structural bias." 8 This concept assumes that the committee members
are inherently prejudiced against suits attacking their fellow directors.' It
further assumes that outside directors are not truly independent because in
most instances they are selected by the defendants. This situation creates
a sense of loyalty to management and allows the defendants to choose individuals who will not "rock the boat."'" Moreover, the committee members
v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979) (independent counsel); Gall v. Exxon Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (former chief justice of New Jersey Supreme Court).
83. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 284 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (committee
considered merits of claim), modified, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979) (committee decision
includes legal considerations).
84. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 487 (1979) (decision whether to enforce corporate claim is a business decision) (Stewart, J., concurring); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The final substantive judgment . . . requires a balance of many
factors-ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well
as legal."), modified, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982).
85. Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 332-33 (directors may recommend settling to avoid expensive
litigation and damage to corporate morale).
86. The defendants will either m6ve for dismissal or summary judgment, and often the
motion is phrased in the alternative. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56(b). In effect, however, the
motion is a hybrid one seeking to establish that the plaintiff has no standing to sue. This motion
is unique because the court does not address the merits of the plaintiff's claim; it merely focuses
on the validity of the committee's decision. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787
(Del. 1981). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2713, at 592-619 (2d ed. 1983).
87. Courts have long applied the business judgment rule to terminate derivative actions
against third parties but rarely when the suit involved allegations of self-dealing. Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 271. The assertion of the business judgment rule in the litigation
committee context presents a unique situation; the rule is used offensively, as a sword wielded
by the defendants based on the litigation committee's decision. In contrast, the rule's traditional posture is defensive, as a shield from liability for honest mistakes. Stegemoeller, supra
note 14, at 338-39. This new application of the business judgment rule focuses judicial attention on the committee's decision, not on the alleged wrongdoing. Note, Business Judgment
Rule, supra note 79, at 631.
88. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 n.5 (D. Conn. 1981) (defining the
problem of structural bias), rev'd, 692 F.2d 880 (2d. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498
(1983); Dent, supra note 14, at 110-16 (discussing the nature of structural bias).
89. Dent, supra note 14, at 110-16.
90. Id. at 112 (citing M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 146 (1976)).
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tend to have social and professional similarities with the inside directors that
engender attitudes highly favorable to the defendants. 9' Structural bias has
been an important consideration when courts have attempted to determine
the scope of the litigation committees' powers under the law.
In 1975, the special litigation committee made its judicial debut in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In Lasker
v. Burks,92 shareholders brought suit against the directors of an investment
company alleging violations of the Investment Advisers Act 93 and the Investment Company Act. 9" The plaintiffs sought recovery for the investment
company's purchase of twenty million dollars in commercial paper of the
Penn Central Transportation Company.9" The defendants moved for summary judgment based on a litigation committee's business judgment that the
96
suit was not in the company's best interests.
Acknowledging the uniqueness of the argument,97 the district court held
that the derivative suit did not give shareholders a right to maintain a corporate cause of action if the decision not to sue was made in good faith. 9
The court referred to the policy underlying the business judgment rule and
reasoned that the directors should be able to control litigation brought on
the corporation's behalf.99 Provided that the committee was genuinely
disinterested and independent, the Lasker court refused to second-guess the
committee's judgment by reviewing the merits of the plaintiff's case."'
While Lasker v. Burks was on appeal, the Exxon Corporation formed
a special litigation committee to evaluate a prospective suit against various
directors. for contributions to Italian political parties between 1963 and 1971.01
In Gall v. Exxon Corp., "2 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York relied on its decision in Lasker and applied the business

91. Id.
92. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I (1981).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (1981).
95. 404 F. Supp. at 1174. The committee retained Stanley H. Fuld, former chief judge
of the New York Court of Appeals, as an independent legal adviser. Id. at 1175.
96. Id.at 1176.
97. Id.at 1178.
98. Id.at 1180.
99. Id.at 1179.
100. Id. at 1180. Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the board's refusal amounted to
an illegal ratification, the court reasoned that the decision not to sue was a business matter
and that many of the early cases applying the business judgment rule to derivative litigation
dealt with arguably nonratifiable claims. Id. (citing United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917)); Ash v. IBM, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 927 (1966).
101. Exxon formed the committee on the same day the district court issued its opinion in
Lasker. The corporation patterned its procedure after that of the defendants in Lasker, even
retaining a retired chief justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court to advise the litigation committee. Bishop, Derivative Suits Against Bank Directors: New Problems, New Strategies, 97
BANKING L.J. 158, 162 (1980).
102. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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judgment rule to the committee's decision to terminate the suit. ' 3 Furthermore, the Gall court expanded the justification for using the rule in this
context. Since the rights sought to be asserted belonged to the corporation,
the committee's decision should be upheld "absent allegations of fraud, collusion, self-interest, dishonesty or other misconduct of a breach of trust
nature, and absent allegations that the business judgment exercised was grossly
unsound.

"104

In the Southern District of New York, therefore, litiga-

tion committees clearly seemed able to effect "business judgment dismissals."
Subsequently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court opinion in Lasker."I Litigation committees appeared doomed to an early extinction until 1979, when the United
States Supreme Court, in Burks v. Lasker,' °6 rejected the Second Circuit's
holding that disinterested directors of an investment company had no power
to terminate a nonfrivolous suit against a majority of directors under the
Investment Company Act.'"' In Burks, the Supreme Court established a twostep test for federal court review of committee decisions to end derivative
litigation.' 0 Under that test, a court initially must determine whether the
law of the company's state of incorporation permits such a dismissal.' 9 If
state law allows a business judgment dismissal, the court must then inquire
whether the state law conflicts with the policies underlying the federal law
in question.''"
Following the Burks decision, courts consistently applied the business judgment rule to litigation committee decisions to terminate derivative suits. The
leading case in the area became Auerbach v. Bennett."' Decided by the New
York Court of Appeals, Auerbach was the first business judgment dismissal
granted by a state's highest court.'2 Similarly, at the federal level the ability
103. Id. at 516.
104. Id. Expressly avoiding a rule that would involve courts in business decisions, the Gall
court allowed the plaintiff time for discovery restricted to the good faith and independence
of the committee. Id. at 519-20.
105. 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
106. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
107. Id. at 481-82. The court of appeals based its holding on the Investment Company Act,
567 F.2d at 1209, but the Supreme Court's opinion seemed to encompass both that act and
the Investment Advisers Act. 441 U.S. at 486.
108. 441 U.S. at 480.
109. Id. The Court reasoned that corporations were governed primarily by state law, with
federal law serving as a regulatory background. Id. at 478. Federal courts have construed this
initial step as requiring a prediction of how the highest court of the corporation's state of
incorporation would interpret its own law. See, e.g., Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp.
682, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
110. 441 U.S. at 480. Essentially, this "consistency test" recognizes that state law is controlling absent specific congressional intent to prevent the termination of suits involving particular federal laws. Id. at 486.
111. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
112. Id. In Auerbach, the plaintiff sought recovery from the directors of General Telephone
& Electronics Corp. (GTE) for contributions to foreign political groups. Reasoning that courts
were ill-equipped to review business decisions, the New York Court of Appeals found the business
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of independent committees to control derivative litigation had emerged as
'' 3
a ''clear trend in corporate law. 1

Ironically, this smooth pattern of business judgment dismissals was ruptured by a series of cases which arose from an identical set of facts. William
Maldonado, a stockholder in the Zapata Corporation, filed actions against
the directors in both state and federal court challenging the modification
of a stock option plan that allegedly raised the corporation's income tax
liability.'" In Maldonado v. Flynn"5 (Maldonado 1), the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York granted a business judgment
dismissal of an action based on the federal securities laws.' 6 In sharp contrast, the Delaware Chancery Court, in Maldonado v. Flynn'" (Maldonado

I), held that the business judgment rule was inapplicable to the committee's decision to terminate a claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty.'" The
vice chancellor concluded that once demand had been refused, shareholders
had an individual right to maintain a proper cause of action without corporate interference."' Reasoning that "courts and not litigants should decide
the merits of litigation,"' 20 the chancery court rejected the notion that litiga-

tion committees had independent power to terminate derivative suits.' 2 '

judgment rule applicable. The court additionally declared that it was the essence of the directors' responsibility to determine whether such a suit served the company's best interests. Id.
at 630-31, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27. Although the two-step Burks test was
inapplicable in Auerbach because it was a state court decision, Auerbach became persuasive
for its interpretion of New York law.
113. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979) (California law), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980); see, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d "724 (8th Cir. 1979)
(Delaware law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (pre-Burks decision).
114. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 671 F.2d 729 (2d
Cir. 1982); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Tex. 1980) (federal suit filed by other Zapata Corp. shareholders). All of these decisions
interpreted Delaware law.
115. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
116. Id. (dismissing a claim based on § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
Previous federal decisions had found no inconsistency between state law and other federal
securities provisions. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979) (§§ 10(b), 10(b)-5,
13(a), and 14(a) of the 1934 Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 1979) (§§ 13(a) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
117. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981).
118. Id.at 1257.
119. Id.at 1262.
120. Id.at 1263.
121. Id.at 1257. The vice chancellor acknowledged the longstanding application of the business
judgment rule as a defensive mechanism, but he disagreed with the federal decisions that had
allowed its use in an affirmative manner. Id. at 1256-57; see also supra note 87. The court
reasoned that although the rule might protect committee members from liability for refusing
to sue, the plaintiff was challenging the alleged misconduct and not the committee's decision.
413 A.2d at 1259.
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Although Maldonado H destroyed the "clear trend" and found acceptance in other jurisdictions,' 22 the triumph of shareholders and their counsel
was short-lived. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,'23 the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the chancery court decision. The supreme court stated that
shareholders did not have an individual right to maintain suit once demand
was refused.' 24 The Zapata court established a new procedure, however, based
on a threshold determination of whether demand was required or whether
it was excused for futility.' 25 In the former situation the business judgment
rule applied, requiring deference to the committee's decision unless that decision was wrongful.' 26 When demand was excused, however, the committee
only had limited power to terminate litigation.' 27 First, the defendant-directors
had to prove the independence, good faith, and reasonableness of the committee and its conclusions.' 28 Second, if the defendants successfully carried
this burden of proof, the court could, in its discretion, apply its own independent business judgment of the corporate interest in continued
litigation.

29

The Zapata decision created a split among courts at both the state and
federal levels regarding the extent of judicial deference to special litigation
committees. Although a majority of courts had favored the Gall-Auerbach
line of cases, following a strict business judgment rule approach, the Zapata
court's use of a hybrid test established a powerful minority position. 3 ' It
122. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Virginia
law), modified, 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Tex. 1980) (Delaware law), aff'd, 714 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1983). But see Gaines v. Haughton,
645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the business judgment rule under California law); Joy
v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981) (business judgment rule applied under Connecticut law), rev'd, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Grossman
v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656 (D. Mass. 1981) (applying business judgment rule under Maryland
law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (business judgment rule
applied under Michigan law); Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981)
(applying business judgment rule under Alabama law).
123. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
124. Id. at 782. The court, however, agreed with the vice chancellor's characterization of
the business judgment rule as primarily defensive in nature. Id.
125. Id. at 784-85.
126. Id. at 784 n.10.
127. The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that because a business judgment dismissal does
not reach the merits of the claim, judicial review should be more strict when demand was
excused as futile. Id. at 788-89.
128. Id. at 788. The court analogized this approach to the intrinsic fairness standard in interested director transactions. Id. at 788 n.17; see also supra text accompanying note 38.
129. 430 A.2d at 789. In making this judgment, the chancery court could also "give special
consideration to matters of law and public policy." Id. As unique as "judicial business judgment" might seem, Delaware case law recognizes this concept as related to judicial approval
of the proposed settlement of alleged self-dealing transactions. Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97, 100 (Del. 1979) (quoting Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 53-54 (Del. 1964)).
130. Cf. Stegemoeller, supra note 14, at 346 (Zapata may dictate the future of derivative
litigation since over 40% of this nation's businesses are incorporated in Delaware). Courts interpreting Delaware law with regard to litigation committees are now required to follow Zapata.
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remained to be seen which course other jurisdictions would take. 3 '
JoY v.

NORTH

Joy v. North'32 resulted from a series of loans made by Citytrust, a
national bank 33 incorporated in Connecticut, to the Katz Corporation
("Katz"), a developer. These primarily unsecured loans were used to finance
34
the construction of an office building in Norwalk, Connecticut.' Citytrust
extended the first loan to Katz in 1971. By the time the last loan was made
in 1976, the bank had suffered a substantial loss, the magnitude of which
has remained in dispute.' 33
In 1977, after making an unsuccessful demand on the directors of Citytrust,

the plaintiff filed a derivative suit in the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut.' 36 The complaint, which alleged breach of

fiduciary duty and violation of the National Bank Act,' 3 7 named as defendants thirty directors and officers of Citytrust and its parent company, Connecticut Financial Services Corporation.' 38 Shortly after the Burks decision

in 1979, the directors appointed a special litigation committee, and after nine
39
months of investigation, the committee reached a result.' The two-person

committee concluded that it was in the bank's best interests to seek dismissal
See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982) (remanding case for consideration
in light of Zapata); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (following Zapata
regarding Delaware corporations); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
131. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982) (modifying Virginia law by reconsidering a case based on Maldonado H in light of Zapata), modifying
495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp.
1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (following Zapata under Iowa law).
132. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
133. Citytrust was a federal bank during the period in which the loans were extended, but
it became a state bank in 1977. Id. at 882 n.l.
134. Id. at 882-83.
135. Id. at 895. The litigation committee's report estimated a loss of $5.1 million. Id. The
majority construed the district court record as indicating that since the issuance of the report,
Citytrust had regained title to the building, thereby greatly increasing the size of the loss. Id.
The defendants, however, protested that Citytrust did not own the building again, and that in fact
the company recovered almost $3 million when the building was sold to a third party. Petition
of 19 Individual Appellees for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 12, Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Rehearing Petition].
136. 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
137. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976). The National Bank Act limits the aggregate loans a bank can
make to a single person or entity to 10% of the bank's combined shareholder equity and capital.
Id.
138. 692 F.2d at 882. Connecticut Financial Services Corporation is now known as Citytrust
Bancorp, Inc. ("Bancorp"). Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1314.
139. 692 F.2d at 883-84. The committee consisted of two nondefendant directors elected after
all of the alleged acts of mismanagement had occurred. Id. Originally, another director was
named to the committee but resigned midway through the investigation. Id. at 833 n.2. The
committee retained independent counsel as well. Id. at 884.
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of the suit against twenty-three outside directors,' 0 and either to continue
litigation or settle out of court vis-a-vis seven inside directors.'' Applying

the Burks test,'

2

the district court granted a business judgment dismissal

of the action against the outside directors.' 3
In an opinion authored by Judge Ralph K. Winter, a divided United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court decision.'
The majority held that Connecticut would adopt a variation of the Delaware
Supreme Court's Zapata formulation.'

5

Lower courts were to apply the

business judgment rule in the demand-required context, but in demandexcused cases they were to exercise their own independent business
judgment.' 6 The majority opinion went considerably beyond Zapata,
however, by requiring, rather than permitting, a business assessment of the
corporation's best interests."' More significantly, the Second Circuit provided the lower courts with detailed instructions on how to apply their judicial
business judgment.

While conceding that courts would encounter difficulties in reviewing committee decisions, the Joy majority reasoned that judges were not wholly
inexperienced in this area.' 8 Many courts had ruled on the intrinsic fairness
of interested director transactions, and it certainly was within a judge's
expertise to predict potential liability.'4 9 The majority also noted that review
of the committee's recommendation would not involve the risk of "decep-

tive hindsight" inherent in most business decisions.'

0

Perhaps most impor-

tantly, the court stated that limiting judicial scrutiny to the committee's good

faith, independence, and thoroughness under the business judgment rule
140. Three of the 23 "outside directors" were either officers, inside directors, or both. Nevertheless, the Joy opinion refers to all 23 as outside directors. Id. at 884. Accordingly, this Note
refers to them as outside directors.
141. Id.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
143. Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1312. The district court interpreted the law of Connecticut, the
state of incorporation of both Bancorp and Citytrust, as supporting extension of the business
judgment rule to decisions to terminate litigation. Id. at 1318-22. Although no Connecticut
court had addressed this specific issue, the district court reasoned that the weight of authority
from other jurisdictions favored such a construction. Id. at 1318-19. The district court found
no conflict with the policies underlying the National Bank Act, especially since Citytrust was
no longer a federal bank. Id. at 1322-25. Finally, the lower court expressly disagreed with
the Zapata case on the grounds that courts should refrain from second-guessing business decisions. Id. at 1328 n.9.
144. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
145. Id. at 891. Judge Cardamone wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion. Id. at 897-900.
146. Id. at 891.
147. Id. at 897-98 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Compare Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) ("The Court may proceed, in its discretion, to the next step.")
with Joy, 692 F.2d at 891 ("independent committee . . . may obtain a dismissal only if the
trial court finds . . .that in the court's independent business judgment ...
the action should
be dismissed").
148. 692 F.2d at 888.
149. Id. at 888-89.
150. Id. at 888.
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would eliminate the derivative suit as the only method of enforcing fiduciary
duties. I5
On the other hand, acknowledging that the incentives underlying derivative
suits encouraged some harmful litigation,' the Joy court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that courts should completely ignore the litigation committee's findings.' 3 Consequently, although the committee's decision should not
be considered presumptively correct, it served a valid purpose as an aid to
the court in determining the corporation's best interests.'" Applying step
one of the Supreme Court's test announced in Burks v. Lasker, the Second
Circuit concluded that Connecticut, Citytrust's state of incorporation, would
adopt a rule similar to Delaware's Zapata test.' Therefore, in demandrequired cases, the committee's decision would be upheld under the business
judgment rule absent a showing of self-interest or bad faith. 5 6 When demand was excused, however, a litigation committee could obtain dismissal
only after the court had examined the committee's good faith, independence,
and thoroughness, and had rendered its own business judgment of the corporation's best interests.' 5'
Nevertheless, the Joy court established some important limitations on its
holding. Judicial business judgment would apply only to "cases involving
allegations of direct economic injury to the corporation diminishing the value
of the shareholders' investment as a consequence of fraud, mismanagement,
or self-dealing."' 5 8 Because the majority's intent was to protect shareholder
investments, its holding excluded claims challenging acts allegedly illegal under
foreign or domestic law, ultra vires transactions, and actions seeking nonmonetary recovery. 59 The court specifically left open the question of what
standard applied in these cases.' 6
The Second Circuit formulated extensive guidelines to assist the lower courts
in determining whether litigation served the corporation's best interests. Initially, the majority held that in a demand-excused context, the defendantdirectors had to prove that the suit was "more likely than not" against the
151. Id. at 889. The majority further reasoned that strict deference to these committees under
the business judgment rule would significantly alter the traditional "intrinsic fairness" standard that applied to interested director transactions. Id. at 888; see supra text accompanying
note 38.
152. 692 F.2d at 890. The court acknowledged that surviving a motion to dismiss or one
for summary judgment did not establish that the action was beneficial to the corporation. Id.
Moreover, the Connecticut statute permitting indemnification of unsuccessful defendant-directors
with court approval, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a (b) (West Supp. 1982), evinced a
legislative recognition of the fact that some derivative actions were not in the corporate interest. 692 F.2d at 890-91.
153. 692 F.2d at 890.
154. Id.at 891.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.at 891-92.
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best interests of the company.' 6' For the defendants to sustain this burden,
a court had to find that "the likely recoverable damages discounted by the
probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the corporation

in continuing the action." 1 '2 The majority emphasized that a court's function was essentially to render a cost-benefit analysis of the derivative suit,
similar to an attorney's determination of what a case was "worth" in terms
of its settlement value.' 63
The Joy majority noted two exceptions to its general rule that only the

direct costs and benefits of litigation were to be included in the lower court's
calculation.' First, if the cost-benefit analysis indicated a low net recovery
in relation to shareholder equity, a court could consider the suit's adverse
effect on management productivity.' 65 Second, when net recovery would be
low and business prosperity depended on a positive public image, a court
could consider potential lost profits due to unfavorable trial publicity.' 66

Finally, treating the case as a demand-excused situation,' 67 the Joy court
applied its own business judgment to the facts. The majority stated that
there was a strong possibility that liability would attach to at least some
of the thirty defendants.' 68 The Katz loans had become increasingly risky,
until ultimately the bank faced a "classic 'no-win' situation"',6 9 in which
profits would at best be low while losses were potentially great. The court
disputed the committee's prediction that there was "no reasonable possibility"
161. Id. at 892. The majority reasoned that the burden of proof traditionally rested with
the party moving for summary judgment. Id.; see also supra note 84. A court was to base
its judgment on data produced during discovery, information compiled during the committee's
investigation, and on the committee's reasoning. The evidence would be weighed according
to traditional evidentiary standards, e.g., whether the testimony was taken under oath and subject to cross-examination. 692 F.2d at 892.
162. 692 F.2d at 892. The majority emphasized that the court's role was to predict the future
benefit of the suit to the corporation and not merely to determine the law and apply it to
the facts. Id.
163. Id. The cost of litigation encompassed attorneys' fees and expenses related to the suit,
plus the hours devoted by corporate personnel to the litigation. The cost of mandatory indemnification of directors also could be included, yet it was qualified by the probability of finding
liability. Discretionary indemnification and insurance coverage, however, were excluded from
the cost equation. Id.
164. Id. The court acknowledged the impact of less tangible factors such as damage to corporate morale and image but reasoned that these elements were too elusive to calculate and
were generally proportional to the degree of wrongdoing. Id.
165. Id.at 893.
166. Id. The court explained that the potential harm to the company in this context did
not necessarily reflect the gravity of the wrongdoing. For the court to consider lost profits
due to bad publicity, however, the defendants had to prove the certainty of such damage by
reference to empirical evidence. Id.
167. Id. at 891. Although demand had been made and refused, the Second Circuit considered
the case as the functional equivalent of a demand-excused situation because demand "was not
required as a condition of bringing the action." Id. at 888 & n.7.
168. Id.at 896.
169. Id. (comparing this situation to the one presented in Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667
(Sup. Ct. 1940)).
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of finding any of the twenty-three outside directors liable, 7 and it questioned the committee's assertion that there was no evidence of intentional
misconduct.' 7 ' The Second Circuit concluded that the committee's recommendation that the shareholder's derivative suit be terminated was invalid
because the district court might find liability resulting in a return far
outweighing the cost of litigation.' 72
ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

The rationale underlying Joy v. North clearly is based on a skeptical view
of special litigation committees.' The limitations placed on the power of
170. Id. The court noted that the committee's basis for recommending dismissal, that the
outside directors were ignorant of the Katz situation, was flawed on two counts. First, theinside directors might later deny that assessment. Second, a failure to keep informed might
itself be a breach of fiduciary duty for lack of due care. Id. The court also dismissed the
committee's conclusion that there was merely a "possibility" that the inside directors would
be held liable. Not only was this prediction a significant understatement, but it was inconsistent with the outside directors' best defense-that management concealed the problem from
them. Id.
171. Id. at 896-97. The court raised doubts about the conduct of defendant North, Citytrust's
chief executive officer and dominant figure on the board. Id. Although North had abstained
from voting on the Katz loans because his son was employed by the Katz Corporation from
1971 to 1976, the committee report indicated that North had played a central role in the transactions. He also had destroyed his own records. Id. at 894. Finally, the court implied that
liability might ensue from North's failure to make the board aware of the problems with the
Katz loans. Id. at 896-97.
172. Id. at 897. The court suggested that a finding of liability might result in a net return
of several million dollars, or over 10% of the shareholder equity, to the corporation. Id.; see
supra note 137 (National Bank Act). This prediction differed significantly from the committee's maximum estimate of $376,000 plus interest. 692 F.2d at 896. Consequently, without reaching
the federal law issue, the majority reversed the order of summary judgment and remanded
the case to the district court. Id. at 897.
The Second Circuit also reversed the district court order placing the litigation committee
report under protective seal. Id. First, the court of appeals held that only compelling circumstances
justified keeping the report under seal during the pendency of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 893. The public nature of a trial and the interest in maintaining public confidence
in the banking and judicial systems demanded such a high standard. Id. Second, the majority
opinion stated that once a court granted summary judgment, a litigation committee was obligated
to divulge not only the contents of its report, but the underlying data as well. Id. Furthermore,
any material arguably qualifying under the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine
lost that protection upon its submission to the court in support of a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 893-94. Therefore, the court stated, the defendants' conclusory statements
in support of the protective order were insufficient. Id. at 894. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Cardamone concurred with the majority on the protective seal issue. Id. at 897 n.l (Cardamone,
J., dissenting).
173. 692 F.2d at 900 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The majority stated that the litigation
committee did not solve the conflict of interest problem inherent in suits against directors because
the defendants effectively chose who would judge them. Id. at 888. The court also remarked:
It is not cynical to expect that such committees will tend to view derivative actions
against the other directors with skepticism. Indeed, if the involved directors expected
any result other than a recommendation of termination at least as to them, they
would probably never establish the committee.
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these committees to terminate litigation reflect the majority's lack of confidence in the ability of such committees to make an unbiased assessment
of the corporation's best interests. What the court's position demonstrates,
however, is a misunderstanding of the nature of litigation committees and
their function under the business judgment rule. It also ignores their strong
record of performance and beneficial role in corporate law. Moreover, the
Joy majority fails to keep the derivative suit in perspective as only one of
many constraints on corporate management. Finally, perhaps the most critical
weakness of Joy v. North is that it violates certain well-established legal
principles.
The Joy court's skeptical view of litigation committees ignores the fact
that committee members have both a knowledge of the corporation's business
and a fiduciary obligation to serve the stockholders.' 4 In general, these outhide directors are people of integrity who are not easily dominated.' 75
Moreover, their positions are not so financially rewarding that they would
be inclined to breach their fiduciary duty by refusing to pursue any and
all litigation against fellow board members.' 76 For example, the committee
in Joy voted to continue suit or seek settlement with respect to seven inside
directors.' "
Admittedly, courts can be more objective than litigation committees in
evaluating derivative suits. This, however, is an "inescapable, given aspect
of the corporation's predicament"' 78 which does not justify substituting the
id. The court considered the committee a "blunt instrument" that seemed to allow dismissals
for "deliberate looting as well as in nuisance suits." Id. at 889. This skeptical attitude even
pervaded the court's decision to lift the protective seal on the committee's findings. The majority reasoned that investor confidence would be shaken if litigation committees were allowed
to operate "in the dark of night." Id. at 893.
174. See, e.g., Estes, Corporate Governance in the Courts, 58 HARV. Bus. REV. 50, 60 (1980)
(outside directors have sufficient knowledge and dedication to judge best interests of corporation); Hinsey, Maldonado (NY) v. Maldonado (DE): Which Prevails?, Legal Times of Wash.,
Aug. 4, 1980, at 20, col. I (a disinterested corporate organ has the advantage of familiarity
with the business) (quoting Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951)).
175. Block and Prussin, supra note 65, at 67; Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 339-40.
176. See, e.g., Block and Prussin, supra note 65, at 57 ("the role of outside directors is
not so rich in perquisites and emoluments as to necessarily tempt such directors to throw their
responsibilities overboard in order to preserve their positions").
177. 519 F. Supp. at 1315. The Second Circuit dismissed this fact as inconsequential for
three reasons. First, most of the seven inside directors were no longer involved with Citytrust.
Second, the committee was to reconsider maintaining suit if settlement was not possible. Third,
the committee might have feared that a decision to dismiss against the seven inside directors
would have destroyed its credibility. 692 F.2d at 888 n.8. In contrast, the district court considered the committee's decision to seek only partial dismissal as further evidence of its good
faith. 519 F. Supp. at 1327. Three commentators have noted that the willingness of litigation
committees to seek alternatives to dismissal is evidence of the legitimacy of these committees.
The cases they cite in support of this statement are Joy and Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d
1025 (2d Cir. 1982), the latter of which resulted in a $1 million settlement. Block, Prussin
& Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Business Judgment Rule: Zapata One
Year Later, 39 Bus. LAW. 401, 407 n.37 (1983).
178. Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1321 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979)).
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judgment of a court for that of an informed committee of disinterested
directors.' 7 9 Nor does it justify a costly trial on the merits to ascertain whether

a claim has any validity. Litigation committees are perfectly capable of both
weeding out harmful suits and presenting management with the unpleasant
resolution to pursue litigation.' 0 More importantly, a sham committee would
be a costly charade that would not survive the test of good faith, in-

dependence, and thoroughness required for a business judgment dismissal.' 8 '
Joy v. North reflects a cynical view of human nature that has been rejected
by many courts' 82 and is inconsistent with reality.
The Joy majority's skepticism also ignores the brief history of litigation
committees, which has demonstrated their diligence and integrity.'83 Apart

from conclusory allegations of structural bias,' 84 there has been almost no
179. Id. at 1328 n.9; Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 30.
180. Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 340; see also Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 177,
at 414-15 (the litigation committee is a legitimate tool to deal with the problem of director
self-interest). But see Joy, 692 F.2d at 888 (conflict of interest problem "hardly eliminated"
by committee).
181. Joy, 692 F.2d at 899 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The Joy dissent also challenged the
majority with failing to answer how a court could determine that a special litigation committee's decision survives the first step of the Zapata test, thereby qualifying as a reasonable,
independent, and good faith decision, yet fails the second step when the court's business judgment differs from the committee's. Id. at 898; see also Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at
61 n.147 (Zapata makes it unclear why passing the first step is not enough to protect shareholders).
Language in some cases indicates that the reasonableness of the litigation committee's decision
can be reviewed. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978)
(court may consider reasonableness of decision); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (committee's judgment may not be "grossly unsound"). Although this Note
recommends that "reasonableness" be added as an additional safeguard to the test for a business
judgment dismissal, it is not clear that this criterion is even necessary. A clearly unreasonable
decision not to sue would be evidence of the committee's bad faith. See Hinsey & Dreizen,
Delaware Court Addresses Business Judgment Rule, Legal Times of Wash., June 8, 1981, at
19, col. 1 (querying whether Zapata's judicial business judgment really means a "reasonableness"
test).
182. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 n.15 (1979) (lack of impartiality cannot be
presumed as a matter of law); Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1321-22 (structural bias alone is insufficient
to nullify a committee decision); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(impeaching a committee's good faith merely due to its appointment by alleged wrongdoers
is a cynical attitude), modified, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); cf. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 6.33, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979) (committee's hesitancy to prosecute fellow directors is inherent in the board's predicament).
183. Estes, supra note 174, at 52, 56. Management has carefully followed the criteria established
by the courts for committee independence. For instance, these outside directors are usually
elected by the board after the alleged misconduct; they are generally well-respected individuals;
they are advised by outside counsel; and their investigations have been painstakingly thorough.
Id.; see also Payson, Goldman & Inskip, After Maldonado-The Role of the Special Litigation
Committee in the Investigation and Dismissal of Derivative Suits, 37 Bus. LAW. 1199 (1982)
(discussing proper methods of choosing committee directors, following investigatory procedures,
retaining special counsel, and performing a thorough investigation).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91; see also Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1327 (noting
the plaintiff's "vigorous and imaginative hypothesizing" in an attempt to impeach the committee's credibility) (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 632, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979)).
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evidence to the contrary. In those cases in which the independence of the
committee has been impeached, courts simply have refused to grant a business
judgment dismissal." 5 Litigation committees also serve the salutary purpose
of utilizing internal measures to correct corporate problems-the same purpose underlying the demand requirement." 6 Furthermore, it is inconsistent
to encourage corporations to bring in outside directors as "watchdogs" of
management and then deny them the authority to perform this function on
litigation committees.' 7 Widely accepted as useful tools for disposing of
harmful derivative suits,' 8 special litigation committees are a natural development 'in the trend toward independent board committees.' 8'
In addition, the majority opinion incorrectly assumes that derivative suits
are the "sole enforcement method"' 9 of fiduciary duties. Dissatisfied
shareholders also have recourse to individual and pure class action suits,
neither of which is contingent on board approval.' 9 ' Moreover, corporate
transactions are subject to numerous state and federal regulations,' 92 the violation of which is readily exposed by a vigorous national press.'"
And where the law ends, the market imposes its own controls on corporate directors. Perhaps the most effective weapon against mismanagement
is the shareholders' power to sell their stock.' 94 Directors have a compelling
185. See, e.g., Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97, 683 (D. Colo. 1980) (bias of committee in favor of directors precluded business judgment
dismissal); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 106-07, 250 S.E.2d 279, 297-98 (1979) (advisory
committee lacked requisite independence).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
187. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979) (noting the inconsistency of relying on
"watchdogs" to protect shareholder interests, then "muzzling" them when they perform this
role); Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 67 (the presumption that committee directors are
not independent conflicts with the rationale for outside directors).
188. Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1321-22; accord Mills v. Esmark, 91 F.R.D. 70, 73 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (referring derivative suits to litigation committees is an "established practice").
189. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 321 (the power to terminate litigation encourages trend toward independent board committees); Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 337 (litigation committees are consistent with the trend toward independent board committees). In addition, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the legitimacy of litigation committees in Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). In that case, the Court noted that Congress's intent was to
entrust independent directors with the responsibility to act as a check on management rather
than resort to judicial supervision. Id. at 483-85. Also, the Burks case dealt with mutual fund
directors, who are generally held to a higher standard of care than the directors of other cor-

porations. Note, Termination of Section 36(b) Actions by Mutual Fund Directors:Are the Watchdogs Still the Shareholders' Best Friends?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 720, 726-28 (1982). If the
Supreme Court accepted the litigation committee in this context, then arguably the Court does
not share the skeptical view held by the Joy majority.
190. 692 F.2d at 889; see supra text accompanying note 151.
191. See Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1321 (shareholder may also bring direct action to enforce
his rights).
192. See, e.g., Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 334 (almost every major corporate decision
involves examination of wide-ranging regulations).
193. See, e.g., Business Roundtable, supra note 5, at 2091 (an "adversary-minded" press
quick to publicize violations of the law is an effective deterrent to corporate corruption).
194. Wolfson, supra note 31, at 993-94.
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interest in performing honestly and competently; job security and career
advancement are powerful incentives.' 95 Furthermore, adherence to ethical
principles is sound business policy in an economic system based on mutual
trust and confidence.' 96 The Joy decision is an example of a failure of the
legal system to understand the institution it governs.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of Joy v. North is that it breaches important principles of law. First, a federal court of appeals should not reverse
a district court decision interpreting the law of the state in which it sits unless
that decision appears to be clearly erroneous.' 97 The majority opinion constitutes judicial second-guessing of the district court's interpretation of Connecticut law on a highly controversial issue.' 9 Second, by placing the burden
of proof on the litigation committee in demand-excused cases, Joy v. North
undermines the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith and correctness surrounding the decisions of directors.'
When the Second Circuit,
in Lasker v. Burks, presumed that directors could never be impartial in
deciding whether to sue fellow board members, the Supreme Court later rejected that view. ' Furthermore, the majority freely substitutes its judgment
for that of the committee on several matters. " ' Most importantly, however,
195. Manne, Controlling the Giant Corporation: Myths and Realities, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PAST AND FUTURE 134-38 (H. Marine ed. -1982). Waste of corporate assets through
directorial misconduct causes stockholders to sell their shares, which drives down their market
price. The corporation is then vulnerable to a takeover that could result in new management.
Id. at 134-35. Directors who wish to advance in the corporation, or obtain better employment
elsewhere, damage their own chances of success by raiding corporate assets or spending them
recklessly. Wolfson, supra note 31, at 971-72. The directors also face reelection by the shareholders
periodically, providing further incentive for them to perform honestly and competently. See,
e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 36 (1979).
196. Rockefeller, Ethics and the Corporation, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 135, 136-38 (1979); Business
Roundtable, supra note 5, at 2099.
197. Lomartira v. American Auto Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Butner
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 58 (1978) (federal district judges are more familiar with state
law in their district and are better able to determine how a state court would decide the issue);
Joy, 692 F.2d at 900 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (federal appellate judges should accord substantial deference to district court interpretations of the state law in their district); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
198. Moreover, neither the district court nor the parties to the action had an opportunity
to consider the relevancy of the Connecticut indemnification statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-320a(b) (West Supp. 1983), which was discussed in the majority opinion. Rehearing Petition, supra note 135, at 7; see supra note 152.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36; see also Panter v. Marshall Field, 646 F.2d
271, 294 (7th Cir.) (the presumption of good faith is heightened when a majority of the board
are outside directors), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Block & Prussin, supra note 65,
at 57 (outside directors should be accorded a presumption of good faith).
200. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 n.15 (1979); see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 900 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (recalling the Supreme Court's holding in Burks).
201. For example, the majority expressly contradicted the committee's conclusion that there
was no evidence of impropriety in the transactions. 692 F.2d at 896. Whether the continued
employment of one's son creates an incentive to extend millions of dollars in loans to the
son's employer is highly questionable. The Joy court also completely disregarded an expert
opinion submitted to the committee stating that the costs of litigation would offset any poten-
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it is judicially imprudent for courts to arrogate power over questions of corporate management. 02 Ordering judges, and perhaps juries," 3 to make
business decisions is simply bad law.20 '
THE EFFECT OF JoY
Courts required to follow Joy v. North with respect to Connecticut corporations will face a difficult, complicated task. The Zapata test was sufficiently complex in itself,20° but the Joy formulation extends far beyond Zapata
by creating a series of elaborate mini-trials based on collateral issues. First,
the demand-required/demand-excused dichotomy which the Second Circuit
borrowed from Zapata presents a crucial threshold issue that ultimately will
undermine the demand requirement. Second, the Joy court's guidelines for
reviewing the litigation committee's decision are excessively cumbersome and
expose the inherent weakness of the judicial business judgment concept.
Moreover, Connecticut corporations will not welcome Joy v. North. They
will find it more difficult to dismiss harmful derivative suits, and, as a result,
they can anticipate increased derivative litigation. 0 6 To the detriment of the
shareholders who ultimately finance this litigation, special litigation committees will become a thing of the past in Connecticut. Finally, the Joy decision comes at a time when a "land weary of overregulation" 2 °7 can ill afford
further controls on business activity.

The majority's adoption of the Zapata dichotomy between demand-required
and demand-excused cases promises to confuse both courts and litigants and
lead to inconsistent results. Although demand on directors originated as a
tial recovery. Id. at 895 n.12. The court of appeals reasoned that this opinion was "not substantiated by verifiable historical evidence or other factual material." Id. Finally, the Second Circuit flatly rejected the committee's conclusions. Id. at 896-97. In contrast, the district court
found the thoroughness of the committee's investigation to be "self-evident," and it considered
the committee's recommendation to continue or settle with respect to the inside directors to
be strong evidence of good faith. 519 F. Supp. at 1327; see also supra note 135 (court of
appeals is apparently mistaken that Citytrust regained ownership of a building, a fact that
greatly affected potential loss).
202. Most businessmen and not a few lawyers consider it not only imprudent but arrogant
for the legal profession to establish rigid rules governing corporations. See, e.g., Lewin, supra
note 1, at D6, col. 4-6 (discussing corporate backlash to the American Law Institute's proposed rules on corporate governance). They protest that the proponents of such rules know
little about the realities of business yet accept the fact that government regulation is good for
the public. See Russo and Wolfson, supra note 2, at F16, col. 4; see also Coffee, Corporate
Misconduct, supra note 2, at 1239 (a court's substitution of its judgment for that of a corporation on whether to proceed with a lawsuit is "inappropriate").
203. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1970) (shareholders have the right to a
jury trial pertaining to "those issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation . . .
would have been entitled to a jury").
204. Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 63. "The very concept that courts have independent
business judgment is, in fact, a contradiction of over 250 years of legal development." Id.
205. See id. at 62.
206. Joy, 692 F.2d at 899 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 898 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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routine procedural requirement, 0 8 its legal significance has long been the
subject of considerable confusion and uncertainty. 20 9 The demandrequired/demand-excused dichotomy exacerbates this problem by greatly
enhancing the importance of the demand issue."' It is likely that a court's
classification of a case as "demand-required" or "demand-excused" will dictate its response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, depending on the
applicability of the business judgment rule."' Consequently, cases will be
decided on the basis of a judge's speculation as to whether demand was,
or would have been, a futile gesture. Demand has thus evolved into an
esoteric substantive issue that will require close examination before a court
can begin scrutiny of the litigation committee."' Moreover, the demandrequired/demand-excused dichotomy is bound to appear arbitrary as interpretations of demand, and rulings on motions to dismiss, vary by
jurisdiction." 3
The most serious drawback of the demand dichotomy which Joy inherited
from Zapata is that it discourages shareholders from making a demand on
the directors." ' To avoid the demand-required situation in which the business
judgment rule applies, the plaintiff will attempt to establish a demand-excused
situation.' Strategically, the plaintiff will prefer to allege futility in the com208. See supra note 51.
209. See, e.g., Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 177, at 413-14 (demand is a complex
and highly uncertain procedure). State laws differ on the definition of when demand is excused
for futility, and judicial interpretations of the demand requirement in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1 vary among the circuits. For instance, federal decisions are inconsistent on the
issue of what the plaintiff must allege in the complaint to show that a board majority was
dominated by the accused wrongdoer and, therefore, not sufficiently disinterested to require
demand. Another point of controversy between the courts is whether directors who merely
authorized or acquiesced in a transaction are considered interested for purposes of demand.
Id. at 410-11.
210. Id. at 410.
211. Id. at 414 n.66 (this dichotomy gives "dispositive significance" to the demand issue)
(citing Coffee, The Problem of CorporateRemedies: The View from ALI Tentative Draft No.1,
at 19, paper presented at Ray Garrett, Jr., Corporate and Securities Law Institute (1982))
[hereinafter cited as Coffee, Corporate Remedies].
212. See Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 60 n.144 (the dichotomy is likely to generate
confusion); Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 177, at 410 (Zapata is a substantive test
being applied to a procedural rule); Coffee, CorporateRemedies, supra note 211, at 19 (the
dichotomy "asks the demand rule to bear more weight than it can realistically carry"). To
further complicate matters, plaintiffs in some cases have urged the court to treat a board refusal
to bring action as the functional equivalent of futility. See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 888 n.7
(demand made but not required to bring suit); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1033
(2d Cir. 1982) (court refuses to treat refusal of demand as the equivalent of futility).
213. Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 177, at 414. Three commentators also have suggested that varying interpretations of the demand requirement will encourage plaintiffs to "forum
shop" in order to find jurisdictions in which demand is often excused. Id.; see also Note,
Demand in Derivative Suits, supra note 73, at 747 (requirement of demand varies according
to court's view of derivative suits).
214. Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 177, at 413.
215. Id.
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plaint rather than try to persuade the court that the board's refusal was
wrongful. 1

6

He may even fear that the very act of making demand will

appear to the court as a concession that the directors' judgment was not
sufficiently impaired to excuse demand." '7 Accordingly, the plaintiff might
consider it advantageous to sue the entire board and claim futility." 8 As
a result, the demand-required/demand-excused dichotomy adopted in Joy
will defeat the demand rule's basic purpose: deference to the directors' discretion by requiring the plaintiff to exhaust his intracorporate remedies.' 9
In the demand-excused context, the Zapata test merely permits the courts
to render a business judgment of whether certain litigation serves the corporation's best interests.22 ' Joy makes this discretionary step mandatory,12
however, and attempts to reduce this decision to a mathematical formula.
Courts following Joy v. North will find the majority's guidelines complicated,
cumbersome, and "subject to judicial caprice." 22 Weighing the costs of litigation against the probable amount of recovery, less the likelihood of finding
liability, engages courts in a comparison of disparate quantities based on
almost pure speculation. 23 To evaluate the many variables in the committee's decision, judges will be required to have a knowledge of public and
employee relations, advertising, and corporate finance. 2 Courts simply are
216. Id. Arguably, plaintiffs can be far more creative in alleging futility in the complaint
than in attempting to prove wrongful refusal on the basis of evidence presented to the court. Id.
217. Id. This prediction especially applies to jurisdictions in which the standards for futility
and wrongful refusal are the same. Id.; see also supra note 62.
218. Brief for Defendants-Appellees Citytrust & Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., at 20 n.61, Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); see also Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981) (incapacitating board by suing all its members
gives too much power to minority shareholders) (quoting Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778,
783 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980)); Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at
67 (plaintiffs usually sue the entire board); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 279 (strong
incentive for manufactured pleadings if plaintiff can incapacitate board by making all directors
defendants). Although demand will not ordinarily be excused merely because the plaintiff has
named most or all of the directors as defendants, see In re Kauffman Mut. Fund 'Actions,
479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 665, 672-73 (D. Del. 1981), a court will then become embroiled in a determination of which directors were improperly joined.
219. See supra text accompanying note 51.
220. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
221. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
222. Joy, 692 F.2d at 898 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 892; supra text accompanying note 158. Courts will have to perform a veritable
juggling act to calculate items such as attorneys' fees, litigation-related expenses, personnel
hours spent on the litigation, and mandatory indemnification-minus insurance. It is also questionable whether courts will be able to quantify "distraction of key personnel" and lost profits
due to bad publicity in cases when there will be a low net return relative to shareholder equity,
692 F.2d at 898 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
224. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979). The Joy court greatly underestimated the difficulty of making business judgments in the litigation committee context. For instance, the "worth" of a case may vary during litigation as the discovery process
develops new evidence and the law changes potential liability. See supra text accompanying
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not competent to make business decisions, " which are often based on un26
quantifiable subtleties and do not lend themselves to structured analysis.1
In short, the Joy opinion illustrates the futility of saddling courts with
elaborate guidelines for making business decisions.227
note 163. A judge may have to rule on summary judgment motions a number of times. Rehearing
Petition, supra note 135, at 10. In Joy, the sale of the office building after the issuance of
the committee report may have substantially lowered the potential amount of recovery, thereby
changing the suit's potential value. Id.; see also supra note 135. The dissenting opinion also
raised some important business considerations which the majority failed to address:
Should a court also take into account the potential adverse impact of continuing
litigation upon the corporation's ability to finance its operation? Should future costs
be discounted to present value, and, if so, at what rate? Must the income tax ramifications of expected future costs be considered, and, if so, how?
692 F.2d at 898 (Cardamone, J.,dissenting). Moreover, the court's statement that review of
the committee's decision would not involve the risk of "deceptive hindsight," id. at 888, ignores the fact that the committee's inquiry includes a retrospective analysis of the alleged wrongdoing to determine the merits of the claim. See supra text accompanying note 83. Therefore,
it is considerably more difficult to review the litigation committee's decision than to determine
the intrinsic fairness of an interested director transaction. See 692 F.2d at 888.
225. Joy, 692 F.2d at 898 (Cardamone, J., dissenting); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d
1025, 1032 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979)); see also Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 177,
at 406-07 (indicating that judicial business judgment has already been improperly applied in
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982)).
226. Cf. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 ("entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and confront
uncertainty"); Note, Continuity Viability, supra note 4, at 568 (encouraging managerial initiative requires discretion to implement bold, even unorthodox, schemes).
227. Brodsky, Business Judgment Rule, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1982, at 2, col. 5. In addition,
Joy v. North created its own mini-trial on the issue of whether the alleged wrongdoing resulted
in direct economic injury to the corporation. To be sure, the court's holding wisely excluded
claims which, if left unredressed, pose no threat to shareholder equity. 692 F.2d at 891.
Shareholders are not "guardians of the public," Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and courts should not encourage expensive
litigation when the motivations to bring suit are somewhat disingenuous. For example, when
attorneys initiate litigation attacking corporate payments in foreign countries, any professed
desire on their part to purify the business community is highly suspect. These transactions usually
further the stockholders' pecuniary interests. Moreover, the costs of litigation, including substantial
attorneys' fees, make the actual benefit to the corporation dubious at best. See Joy, 692 F.2d
at 890 (recognizing that motives behind derivative litigation often lead to suits resulting in no
net corporate benefit); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 308 (questioning the practice of
allowing "bounty hunters" to continue financially detrimental suit for the sole purpose of deterring dorruption); 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 49,
2, at 33 (1971) (inthe derivative
suit context, "lawyers . . . sometimes act out of self-interest").
Nevertheless, the "direct economic injury" limitation presents another complex issue for the
court. In demand-excused cases, it may have to be determined whether or not the plaintiff's
complaint states a primarily economic cause of action, thereby avoiding the business judgment
rule. For instance, corporate payments to foreign officials may be illegal under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. 1, 91 Stat. 1494 (amending various
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78). A shareholder-plaintiff might
argue, however, that he is not attacking the illegality of the payments, but rather that the
transactions constituted a waste of corporate assets. Consequently, analysis of the claim will
require the judge to draw fine distinctions based on sophisticated, and perhaps disputed, economic
standards.
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When the plaintiff is successful in creating a demand-excused situation, 28
the Joy decision prevents quick disposition of harmful suits. Surviving a
motion to dismiss, or one for summary judgment, is a low hurdle for plaintiffs to clear."' Yet, requiring the defendants to prove the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether litigation is "more
likely than not" 3 ' against the corporation's best interests will be difficult
indeed.
In addition, the expansion of liability, especially that of outside directors, 23'
will militate against outright dismissal. With a greater chance to reach a
decision on the merits, the plaintiff's prospects for success will improve.
More importantly, although findings of ultimate liability may remain rare,232
mounting legal expenses will force out-of-court settlements regardless of the
validity of the claim.233 Derivative suits will become even more attractive

in an era of unprecedented court congestion.

3'

Without the full benefit of the business judgment rule, boards of Connecticut corporations will have little incentive to establish litigation committees.
In demand-required cases, the committee will only be therapeutically useful
because a decision by the full board not to sue will be upheld unless
'
wrongful. 35 The litigation committee "plays its role," 236
therefore, primarily
in demand-excused cases. By placing the committee under judicial supervi228. See supra text accompanying notes 180-83.
229. 692 F.2d at 892.
230. See id. at 890 (surviving motions to dismiss and those for summary judgment establishes

little evidence of a claim's merit); Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 30 (courts are notoriously
reluctant to grant summary judgment).
231. See, e.g., Note, Safe Harbors and Stormy Seas: Trends and Countertrends in Outside
Director Liability, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359, 364 (1981) (courts have become far more strict
in applying the standard of due care to outside directors). An excellent example of this is Joy,
in which the court refused to dismiss a suit against 23 outside directors because their ignorance
of the wrongdoing may itself have been a breach of fiduciary duty. 692 F.2d at 896; see supra
text accompanying note 218.
232. Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 29; Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 326-27.
233. See Dawson, supra note 49, at 859 (settlement may represent submission to escape costs
and disruption of litigation). One corporate commentator has illustrated this scenario dramatically:
The over-deposed, over-interrogated and over-discovered defendant, pursued by teams
of lawyers, becomes victimized by the process, not by the effects of the allegedly
wrongful conduct. Pragmatists as they are, managers reluctantly turn their attention to settlement, not to avoid adjudication of their alleged guilt, but to end the
process and return their labors to the ongoing affairs of the entities they are charged to manage.
Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 333.
234. See Olson, Delaware Court Addresses Business Judgment Rule, Legal Times of Wash.,
June, 1981, at 19, col. 2 (shifting the burden of proof away from a presumption of good
faith will add to court congestion); see also Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 331 ("Few would
disagree ... that ... contemporary America is an overly litigious society."); Wiedrich, Frivolous
Lawsuits Get Just Desserts, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 8, 1983, § 2, at 1, col. I (America has
become an increasingly litigious society).
235. Joy, 692 F.2d at 887; see supra text accompanying note 59.
236. Joy, 692 F.2d at 888.
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sion in this context, Joy puts the board in a no-win situation. Demand will
be excused more readily because derivative plaintiffs usually sue the entire
board;237 under the Joy court's approach, directors may be deemed interested

whether they participated in, acquiesced in, or merely failed to prevent the
alleged wrongdoing.23

With an "interested"

board unable to terminate

litigation, " ' the litigation committee becomes the last viable corporate organ
that could dispose of harmful suits.2"' The Zapata-Joy formulation, however,

gives control over the derivative suit to the courts at the behest of minority
shareholders and their attorneys.2

'

Reduced to an advisory capacity, special

litigation committees will become a needless and expensive formality.

'

237. E.g., Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 67 (most derivative suits challenge actions
of the entire board in either participating, or failing to participate, in certain transactions).
238. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979) ("To allow one shareholder
to incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by leveling charges against them gives too
much leverage to dissident shareholders."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); see also Clark
Enters., Inc. v. Holywell Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("Demand is almost
always excused in derivative suits alleging that the directors have engaged in wilful or negligent
breach of their fiduciary duties. . . . [or] where the board of directors is subject to the control
of the alleged wrongdoers."). But see Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of derivative action against entire board of directors on grounds that "mere
approval and acquiescence [of the alleged wrongdoing] are insufficient to render demand futile");
Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting the contention that suing the
entire board, without considering whether each director actually participated in the wrongdoing, rendered that board unable to decide whether to pursue the shareholder's claim for purposes of demand; nominal defendants are not "interested" for purposes of demand). The Joy
court confirmed the fears of the Ninth Circuit in Lewis v. Anderson, however, by excusing
demand even though defendant North dominated the board and the 23 outside directors were
suspected of guilt for being "left in the dark." 692 F.2d at 896. The majority opinion seems
to present a classic situation of "damned if you do and damned if you don't."
239. Joy, 692 F.2d at 887-88; see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979) (investing authority to decide the merits of a
shareholder's claim in persons not associated with the board would itself be a breach of fiduciary
duty).
240. Cf. Hinsey, supra note 174, at 18, col. 1. Hinsey analogizes the special litigation committee situation to the "Massachusetts Rule," whereby if a disinterested corporate organ
exists, it should decide whether certain litigation serves the corporate interest. Id. (citing Pomerantz
v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1951)). He notes that "[a) disinterested
internal organ of the corporation has the advantage of familiarity with the enterprise, with
those who have conducted it and with the record of success or failure." Id. (quoting Pomerantz,
101 F. Supp. at 344). Although the Massachusetts Rule originally referred to a determination
by the stockholders as to whether the corporation should pursue a derivative claim, the fact
that often only a small percentage of shareholders vote on corporate issues renders this application of the rule somewhat impractical.
241. See Joy, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1328 n.9 (D. Conn. 1981) ("neither shareholders nor the
courts should be free to second-guess the directors"); Auerbach v. Bennett. 47 N.Y.2d 619,
633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979) (judicial supervision of the decision
whether to litigate undermines the board's basic responsibility for corporate management); Dent,
supra note 14, at 119 (an attorney has little incentive to consider the corporation's best interests).
242. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 101, at 160 (1980) (the litigation committee is an expensive defensive strategy).
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By rendering litigation committees useless to Connecticut corporations, the
Joy court has damaged the interests of the shareholders it intended to protect. Typically, shareholders are concerned solely with achieving a maximum
yield on their investment, not asserting their rights as part-owners." 3 Apart
from egregious acts of mismanagement or abuse, they probably would oppose
most suits against directors for one simple reason. In most instances, they
have nothing to gain from the litigation, yet win, lose, or settle, they indirectly pay for the often exorbitant costs of those suits.2" Not only are
derivative suits disruptive to the corporation,2" 5 but the fact that the directors frequently prevail on the merits means that the corporation will pay
for teams of defense lawyers24 6 and sometimes the losing plaintiff's attorneys'
fees as well. 4 7 Most derivative suits are financial losses for the corporation, "
and even the deterrent value of successful litigation may be nullified by corporate indemnification of the directors' liability.2"9 Consequently, the only
parties truly threatened by special litigation committees are entrepreneurial
attorneys and dissident shareholders who are not particularly concerned with
making a profit on their investment.25 In a well-meaning effort to protect
the interests of the shareholders, the Joy court has imposed unwanted costs
on the majority by asserting the rights of a few.
The type of judicial activism embodied in Joy v. North drains the vitality
of the business community. One commentator has written that "extensive
judicial scrutiny of business decisions on behalf of 3 percent shareholders
• , * entail[s] rigid rules restricting management's ability to make business
judgments." 2 ' In this light, the attitude that the deterrent value of derivative
suits justifies even harmful litigation, because corporations can afford it,
is both dangerous and naive.252 It is dangerous because in a highly competitive world economy, risk taking and entrepreneurialism are essential to
economic growth, which is directly related to employment and the production of goods and services.253 It is naive because the real winners in this
litigation are the attorneys who thrive on stirring up lawsuits at corporate
expense."" Moreover, this attitude reflects and perpetuates the antibusiness
243. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 301 (2d ed. 1977).
244. See supra note 47-48 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text accompanying note 65.
246. Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 29.
247. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
248. Block & Prussin, supra note 65, at 30.
249. Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 327-30; see supra note 65.
250. Cf. R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 31 (1978) (calls for more
shareholder powers are invariably made by small groups of people who are not interested in
maximizing shareholder investments).
251. Id. at 15.
252. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 49, at 870 (discussing social policy that corporations
"can afford to pay and should pay for the 'therapy' administered in stockholders' suits").
253. See, e.g., Russo & Wolfson, supra note 2, at F16, col. 6 ("Business cannot generate
jobs, goods and services if it is stifled by unnecessary Governmental regulation.").
254. Duesenberg, supra note 48, at 333.
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bias in society that has led to the wholesale acceptance of much unnecessary
governmental regulation. 2" Admittedly, courts should endeavor to prevent
fraud and corruption in business. There is a point, however, at which judicial
regulation imposes greater social costs than it prevents.256 The Joy court has
crossed this threshold by contributing to a commercial climate that will neither
attract nor keep business in Connecticut.257
CONCLUSION

In Joy v. North, the Second Circuit adopted a variation of the approach
to special litigation committees established in the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado. Requiring judges, in demand-excused
cases, to render a business judgment of a corporation's best interests, reflects
a skeptical view of litigation committees that is founded more in theory than
in fact. The Joy decision ignores the strong record of performance established
by these committees, and it overlooks the safeguards inherent in the business
judgment rule. The Second Circuit also failed to recognize that the derivative
suit is only one of many constraints, both legal and economic, placed on
corporate directors. The Joy court's most significant errors, however, are
based on its derogation of traditional legal principles. The majority secondguesses the district court's interpretation of Connecticut law, reverses the
business judgment rule's historic presumption of directorial good faith, and
flagrantly intervenes in the management of corporate affairs.
The significance of Joy v. North lies in the fact that it compounds the
confusion inherent in the Zapata court's approach to special litigation committee decisions. In the analysis that Joy inherits from Zapata, the elusive
issue of demand assumes paramount importance, creating an outcomedeterminative test that discourages shareholders from deferring to the directors' authority to pursue corpoate claims. In addition, the Joy decision
transforms Zapata's dubious concept of judicial business judgment into a
complex equation of imprecise variables that is sure to lead to judicial misapplication. Moreover, Joy v. North will impose unnecessary costs on Connecticut corporations and their shareholders. With litigation committees mere
advisory bodies in the demand-excused context where they are most needed,
the boards of these corporations will not bother to establish impotent committees. As a result, derivative litigation will increase at the expense of the
stockholding majority.
Finally, while this kind of judicial intervention in business affairs may
255. Joy, 692 F.2d at 898 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Wolfson, supra note 31, at
988-89).
256. Cf. R. WINTER, supra note 250, at 12-13 (attempts to eliminate business corruption
by creating mandatory legal rules often reduce corporate efficiency and impose costs on the
public).
257. Rehearing Petition, supra note 135, at 1-2; see also Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682, 687 (ED. Mich. 1980) (noting the legislative intent to create a favorable business
climate); R. WINTER, supra note 250, at 8 (discussing benefits of Delaware corporate laws).
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be a boon to derivative plaintiffs and their attorneys, it bears hidden costs
which society cannot afford. The Second Circuit's decision can only make
corporate counsel more wary of new business ventures, an effect that is particularly unfortunate in light of today's uncertain economic climate. Joy v.
North is one more example of the judicial penchant for stepping in to arrange
private affairs without realizing that the cure is more harmful than the disease.
Alexander R. Rothrock
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